For the second consecutive season, one of baseball’s best offenses stopped looking like itself as the year progressed.
Fabian Ardaya of The Athletic highlighted that pattern Wednesday morning, noting that the Dodgers led baseball offensively through June in both 2025 and 2026 before their production declined afterward.
Andrew Friedman does not believe the explanation is as simple as blaming the age of the roster.
The numbers suggest he is right that the problem is more complicated.
The Dodgers were not merely an old lineup that became progressively worse each month. They dominated early, collapsed during July and August, rebounded in September and then disappeared again when the competition became more difficult in October.
That inconsistency may be more concerning than a straightforward decline.
The Monthly Numbers Show A Dramatic Change
The Dodgers recorded a team OPS of .818 in April, .780 in May and .788 in June.
They were producing power, reaching base and regularly forcing opponents to pitch from behind.
That changed quickly.
Los Angeles dropped to a .710 OPS in July and a season-low .689 in August. The Dodgers went 26-25 across those two months while producing a 94 wRC+, which ranked 21st in baseball.
It was a similar pattern to 2025, when their offense posted a 99 wRC+ during July and August after ranking among baseball’s best through June.
The 2026 Dodgers appeared to solve the problem in September. They produced a .792 OPS, ranked second in baseball with a 121 wRC+ and went 18-7.
Then October arrived.
Los Angeles hit only .195/.267/.323 during the postseason, finishing with nine home runs and 25 runs. Its 63 wRC+ represented a complete collapse from the production seen during September.
That makes it difficult to blame everything on fatigue.
If the Dodgers were simply worn down, how did they become one of baseball’s best offenses again in September?
The more likely answer is that multiple issues were occurring at different times.
Opponents Found A Way To Attack The Lineup
One of the most noticeable changes involved how opposing pitchers challenged the Dodgers.
During the opening months, Los Angeles punished fastballs and sinkers. Its wRC+ against those pitches reached 149 in March and April, 147 in May and 136 in June.
Pitchers responded by becoming more aggressive.
The Dodgers saw fastballs and sinkers on 51.3 percent of their pitches in July, up from approximately 45 percent during the opening two months. Their production against those pitches fell to a 98 wRC+ in July and 104 in August.
Los Angeles was being challenged with velocity and was no longer doing enough damage to force pitchers away from that plan.
The effects extended beyond batting average.
The Dodgers’ home-run-to-fly-ball rate fell from 16.4 percent before July to 11 percent during their midsummer decline. Their walk rate also dropped from 10.5 percent to 7.8 percent.
When hitters stopped punishing pitches in the strike zone, pitchers had less reason to work carefully around them. That resulted in fewer walks, fewer baserunners and fewer innings in which one swing could change the game.
The Dodgers adjusted in September and posted a 163 wRC+ against fastballs and sinkers. The problem was how long that adjustment took—and whether it carried over against postseason pitching.
A championship offense cannot afford to spend two months searching for an answer after opponents identify a weakness.
Age May Be A Factor Without Being The Entire Explanation
The Dodgers had baseball’s oldest group of position players, so age cannot be dismissed entirely.
Older players generally require more recovery time. Small injuries can linger longer, and maintaining bat speed across six months becomes more difficult.
Friedman acknowledged that the Dodgers may need to become more proactive when creating rest for their veteran hitters.
However, he rejected the idea that age alone explains the decline.
“I don’t think it’s as easy as to paint it with that broad of a stroke,” Friedman said during his October 21 press conference.
He described the offense as a game of “whack-a-mole,” with one problem appearing before another replaced it. Friedman said the Dodgers must separate random short-term results from issues they can actually address.
That is a reasonable position.
The ages on the roster did not suddenly change on July 1. The same veteran hitters who struggled during July and August helped produce one of baseball’s best offenses in September.
The question is whether Los Angeles can better manage their workloads and make adjustments before those slumps consume entire months.
Mookie Betts Still Showed He Could Adjust
Mookie Betts has spent most of his career as one of baseball’s premier offensive players, winning the 2018 American League MVP Award and becoming a central figure in three championship runs.
The past two seasons have been more difficult.
Betts finished 2025 with a .732 OPS, the lowest mark of his career. His overall 2026 production remained below the standard he established during his prime, but his finish provided some encouragement.
He hit .317/.376/.516 over his final 47 regular-season games, demonstrating that he could still make an adjustment and produce at a high level for an extended stretch.
The issue is sustaining it.
What the Dodgers need to determine is whether Betts’ late-season improvement represents something he can carry into 2027 or another temporary surge inside a larger two-year decline.
Workload may also be part of that conversation. Betts is no longer only being asked to anchor the top of the lineup. He has also taken on the physical and mental demands of playing shortstop.
Freddie Freeman’s Knee Cannot Be Ignored
Freddie Freeman has been one of baseball’s most dependable hitters for more than a decade.
He won the 2020 National League MVP Award and has built his career around exceptional consistency, plate discipline and an ability to use the entire field.
Even while dealing with right-knee patellar tendinitis, Freeman hit .295/.373/.450 during the 2026 regular season.
Those remain strong numbers.
But the question is not whether Freeman can continue being productive. It is whether the Dodgers can keep him healthy enough to produce his best swings when October arrives.
Freeman required scheduled rest during September and acknowledged making temporary mechanical changes while trying to manage the knee.
At 37 next season, Freeman should not be expected to prove his toughness by playing through every physical problem. The Dodgers may need to protect him from himself by building more regular rest into the schedule.
Shohei Ohtani’s Two-Way Workload Requires A Better Plan
Shohei Ohtani has produced at an MVP level for much of his career, but his 2026 season demonstrated how quickly his pitching and hitting responsibilities can affect one another.
Ohtani still hit .275/.377/.512 with 30 home runs and 81 RBIs. Those would represent an excellent season for almost anyone else.
His production, however, declined after knee and biceps problems interrupted his year. He finished the postseason batting .192, and his lone October home run ended the longest homerless stretch of his career.
Ohtani has taken responsibility for his offensive struggles and has resisted using his physical condition as an excuse.
The Dodgers still need to examine how his workload contributed.
Friedman expects Ohtani to pitch again in 2027, but the organization has not detailed how often he will start or how aggressively it will manage his recovery between outings.
What to watch next season is not merely whether Ohtani can resume being a two-way player. It is whether the Dodgers can prevent his pitching responsibilities from compromising the bat they need in September and October.
Josue De Paula Can Help, But Youth Is Not A Complete Solution
Josue De Paula represents the most obvious opportunity to inject youth into the lineup.
He earned his promotion after hitting .303/.401/.547 with 27 home runs, 104 RBIs and 31 stolen bases at Double-A Tulsa. He then went 10-for-31 with five extra-base hits and reached base in half of his first 42 Major League plate appearances.
The Dodgers barely used him during the postseason, giving him four plate appearances.
De Paula’s defense remains the most significant obstacle between him and an everyday role. The Dodgers are prioritizing his outfield work this offseason because an impact bat does not help the lineup if they do not trust the player to remain on the field.
What to watch in 2027 is whether De Paula receives legitimate opportunities instead of being treated only as an occasional left-handed bench option.
He could add athleticism, power and energy to the lineup, but simply adding one 21-year-old will not solve a team-wide problem.
What Actually Needs To Change?
The Dodgers do not need to abandon their veteran core. They need a better plan for keeping that core productive over a complete season.
That should include:
More proactive rest before players become compromised.
Faster adjustments when opponents change their pitching plans.
Enough lineup depth to sit a struggling veteran without weakening multiple positions.
More regular opportunities for young players who can create competition for at-bats.
Greater offensive versatility when home runs are not available.
A postseason approach capable of producing against elite velocity and pitching depth.
The Dodgers still finished second in baseball with a 111 wRC+ during the regular season. This was not a bad offense.
But season-long rankings can hide the timing of the production.
Crushing pitching in April does not help when the lineup cannot generate offense in October. Dominating weaker opponents in September does not guarantee the same approach will succeed against the best staffs in the postseason.
The Dodgers do not need to choose between their veterans and their young players. They need a lineup deep enough, healthy enough and adaptable enough to remain dangerous after the rest of baseball has spent six months identifying how to attack it.
What do you believe affected the Dodgers more: age, injuries, workload or an inability to adjust quickly enough?